The nights the phones went dark
On the night of 18 October 2024, two cars intercepted a vehicle in central Maputo and the gunmen who got out fired dozens of rounds into it. They killed Elvino Dias, a 45-year-old lawyer who advised opposition presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, and Paulo Guambe, an election agent of Podemos, the party backing Mondlane's run. Mozambique had voted nine days earlier and the count was already in dispute. The crime is still unsolved.
Protests began on 21 October. Three days later the election commission declared Frelimo's Daniel Chapo the winner with 70.67 per cent, and Mondlane used Facebook to call nationwide strikes. The next day, mobile internet started to fail.
It failed on a schedule. Network monitors recorded drops on 25–26 and 31 October and nightly cuts on the state operator Tmcel from 4 to 8 November — connectivity falling in the evening and returning by morning — in Maputo and in Nampula. From 29 October, Facebook and WhatsApp were restricted. On 31 October the three mobile operators, Vodacom, Movitel and Tmcel, sent customers the same message: access to some social networks was "temporarily restricted for reasons beyond our control." The reasons had an address. INCM, the communications regulator, defended the restrictions as a national-security response to content that promoted violent demonstrations — and cited the Telecommunications Law as its authority. On 18 November the operators confirmed full restoration. Nobody explained anything.
By then police were answering marches with live fire. Plataforma Decide, the civil-society monitor that kept the ledger, had counted about 314 people killed by gunfire, about 633 wounded and more than 4,236 arrested by mid-January. On 23 December the Constitutional Council's president, Lúcia da Luz Ribeiro, spent an hour and a half reading the proclamation that confirmed Chapo's win at 65.17 per cent — the Council acknowledged irregularities and ruled they had not influenced the result — and in the two days that followed, at least 21 more people were killed.
That is what "traffic control" means in Mozambique. Hold onto it, because every document below is about it.
A year later, the rulebook
Eleven months after Chapo was sworn in, the practice got its paperwork. On 16 December 2025 the Council of Ministers published Decreto n.º 48/2025, approving the Regulamento de Controlo de Tráfego de Telecomunicações. It gave INCM the power to suspend telecommunications services and to take "quaisquer outras medidas" — any other measures — and it obliged operators to monitor traffic continuously, block communications, and hand data to state bodies, metadata included. What had been done to the network in late 2024, deniably and "for reasons beyond our control", now had numbered articles. The decree also revoked its predecessor, Decreto n.º 38/2023.
An ombudsman, not an NGO
The challenge came from inside the state. In February 2026 the Provedor de Justiça — Mozambique's Ombudsman, petitioning under article 244(2)(f) of the Constitution — asked the Constitutional Council to strike the decree on two grounds: the Government had legislated where only Parliament may, and the scheme violated the rights to expression, private life and the inviolability of communications. His metadata argument was the sharpest thing in the file: access to metadata permits "a reconstrução detalhada de padrões de comunicação, localização geográfica, redes de contactos, hábitos quotidianos, preferências pessoais e até inclinações políticas e religiosas" — the detailed reconstruction of communication patterns, location, contact networks, daily habits, personal preferences, and even political and religious leanings.
Eighteen provisions, six signatures
On 29 July 2026, in Acórdão n.º 6/CC/2026, the Council struck the decree's operative core: the suspension power, the catch-all, the continuous-monitoring and blocking duties, the data handover, the metadata access, and seven whole articles — eighteen provisions, in a single operative limb. (An earlier version of this edition said nineteen; the operative list runs to eighteen.) Six judges signed, with no dissent and no separate opinion. The order stops there — nothing on transitional effect, nothing on what governs traffic control now. The first signature is Lúcia da Luz Ribeiro — the president who read the December 2024 proclamation.
Sixteen pages, and the crisis that produced the decree appears in none of them: no protests, no dead, no blocked platforms, not even the year 2024. Abstract review is exactly that abstract.
Who may build it, not whether
The Council took the Ombudsman's first ground and stopped. It framed the question in bold on page 9: Lei n.º 4/2016, the Telecommunications Law invoked as the decree's legal basis, "não contém qualquer norma que autoriza a vigilância estrutural e permanente das comunicações" — contains no provision authorising structural and permanent surveillance of communications. Note the echo: that is the same Telecommunications Law INCM pointed to in November 2024 to justify the blocks.
Article 178(2) of the Constitution reserves the limitation of fundamental rights to the Assembleia da República — a reserva absoluta, the Council held, which cannot be handed to the Government even by legislative authorisation, let alone assumed by regulation. The decree "instituiu um regime normativo de monitorização, recolha de dados, suspensão de serviços e intervenção em redes" — instituted a regime of monitoring, data collection, service suspension and network intervention — without the parliamentary statute that alone could authorise it.
So the holding decides who may build this, not whether it may exist. Nothing in the judgment finds continuous monitoring disproportionate, or a kill switch incompatible with anything beyond the separation of powers. Parliament could pass the same text as a statute and this ruling would not stand in its way. And Parliament is not neutral ground: Frelimo holds 171 of the Assembleia's 250 seats. The Government, for its part, said on 3 August that it respects the ruling — words that cost it nothing.
Fifty-two pages, returned unread
The Government did try to defend its decree. On 6 April 2026, inside the deadline, the Council of Ministers filed a 52-page defence through a lawyer — whose power of attorney, signed by the Prime Minister, authorised counsel to appear before the Tribunal Administrativo da Cidade de Maputo. A different court. The Council refused the filing on a ground broader than the wrong forum: in abstract review, it held, a notified body may not instruct counsel at all, because the proceeding is institutional rather than a contest between parties. And since "não resulta da LOCC qualquer efeito cominatório, no caso de falta ou ilegitimidade de pronunciamento" — no penalty attaches to a missing or improper response — the Council proceeded to judgment on the Ombudsman's case, unanswered. Nobody outside the court has read a word of what the Government would have argued.
The scan that kept it secret
The ruling has been public since 31 July. It has also been, in the only sense that matters, unpublished: the PDF on the Council's site has no text layer. pdftotext recovers sixteen characters from sixteen pages; every page is a greyscale scan. It cannot be searched, copied, indexed or machine-translated — which is why coverage so far amounts to one English-language wire item and no story anywhere that quotes it. Every passage above exists because this desk rasterised the pages, ran them through an OCR tool written for the purpose, and checked the output against the images character by character.
A court order that cannot be searched cannot be cited, checked, or held against the next decree. It is findable and not readable — the way a public record becomes a private one without anyone deciding to close it. The fix costs nothing: publish the text beside the scan.
The bill to watch
What this ruling guarantees is not that the switch is gone. It is that the next one must be a statute of the Assembleia da República, drafted and debated in public by a chamber the whole country can watch — in front of the people the switch was used on last time. Watch for that bill. And when you cite the case, cite ***Acórdão n.º 6/CC/2026*, Processo n.º 03/CC/2026, 29 July 2026** — not the wire summaries, which have the ground wrong.
References (1 sources)
References
- Acórdão n.º 6/CC/2026, Processo n.º 03/CC/2026, Conselho Constitucional da República de
Moçambique, 29 July 2026 — cconstitucional.org.mz/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Acordao-no-6-CC2026-de-29-de-Julho-2026.pdf. Re-downloaded 6 August 2026, HTTP 200, 843,384 bytes, PDF 1.4, 16 pages, sha256 5000425d9edaa64ea038c08723dbc4cbf25a9f6012425fdc120bdb6ec7df18c2. Signed by Lúcia da Luz Ribeiro, António do Rosário B. Boene, Ozias Pondja, Albano Macie, Albino Augusto Nhacassa and Alberto H. J. Nkutumula. The dispositivo has a single lettered limb striking, for organic unconstitutionality: article 5(a), (e), (f), (g), (j), (k); article 6(1)(a), (b), (f), (g); article 6(3)(a); and articles 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18 and 19 — eighteen provisions. It says nothing about transitional effect, severability, or what now governs. Internal date contradiction, verified on the page images: pp. 2, 3, 5, 9, 13 and 14 date the decree 16 de Dezembro; pp. 15–16 — the holding and the operative order — date it 18 de Dezembro while citing publication on 16 December 2025.
- Text extraction, this desk. The PDF has no text layer:
pdftotext -layoutreturns 16 characters
over 16 pages, pdffonts lists no fonts, r.jina.ai returns an empty body, and pdfimages -list shows one 1240×1754 greyscale JPEG per page plus CCITT stencil masks. tesseract and ocrmypdf are not installed here. Pages were rasterised with pdftoppm -r 200 -png and read with Apple's Vision framework (VNRecognizeTextRequest, revision 3, .accurate, languages pt-BR/pt-PT/es-ES/en-US) via a 40-line Swift program compiled with the system swiftc. Every passage quoted here was re-verified against the page image. Known OCR artefacts are logged in the working file; note that inviolabidade on p.5 is a typo in the original, not an extraction error.
- Decreto n.º 48/2025, approving the Regulamento de Controlo de Tráfego de Telecomunicações,
published in Boletim da República, I Série, n.º 241, 16 December 2025; it revoked Decreto n.º 38/2023 of 3 July.
- Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique — arts. 2, 41, 48, 56, 65, 68, 69, 71, 140, 178, 181,
243(1)(a), 244(2)(f). Lei n.º 2/2022 of 21 January (Lei Orgânica do Conselho Constitucional) — arts. 55, 56, 64(2)(f), 67, 69. Lei n.º 4/2016 of 3 June (Lei das Telecomunicações) — art. 14, cited by the Ombudsman as regulatory-administrative in nature and not reaching the core of fundamental rights. Código de Processo Civil art. 487, under which the Council of Ministers filed on 6 April 2026. Prior authority cited by the Council at footnote 2: Acórdão n.º 6/CC/2020 of 1 April (Processo n.º 36/CC/2018), p. 4.
- The 2024–25 crisis (sources added at the 9 August rewrite, all retrieved 9 August 2026):
- Al Jazeera, "Gunmen kill two Mozambique opposition officials ahead of election protests", 19 October 2024 — aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/19/gunmen-kill-two-mozambique-opposition-officials-ahead-of-election-protests. Club of Mozambique (Lusa), "Police continue to investigate the murders of Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe, one year on", October 2025 — the interception by two vehicles, dozens of rounds, Dias's age, the case unresolved — clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-police-continue-to-investigate-the-murders-of-elvino-dias-and-paulo-guambe-one-year-on/. - Human Rights Watch, "Mozambique: Post-Election Internet Restrictions Hinder Rights", 6 November 2024 — hrw.org/news/2024/11/06/mozambique-post-election-internet-restrictions-hinder-rights. Platform restrictions from 29 October (Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Telegram, WhatsApp), the operators' 31 October SMS ("temporarily restricted for reasons beyond our control"), INCM's justification citing the Law on Telecommunications, and the operators' 18 November confirmation of full restoration, unexplained. - Amanda Meng, Tara Kelly and David Belson, "Mozambique's Post-Election Fallout: Fatal Protests and Widespread Internet Shutdowns", Internet Society Pulse / IODA, 26 February 2025 — pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/mozambiques-post-election-fallout-fatal-protests-and-widespread-internet-shutdowns. Connectivity drops 25–26 and 31 October 2024 and nightly drops 4–8 November on Tmcel, localised to Maputo City and Nampula; restrictions began the day after the 24 October results announcement and Mondlane's Facebook strike calls. - Club of Mozambique (Lusa), "Daniel Chapo proclaimed president of Mozambique with 65.17% of Votes", 23 December 2024 — clubofmozambique.com/news/just-in-mozambique-elections-daniel-chapo-proclaimed-president-of-mozambique-with-65-17-of-votes-273001/ — the ninety-minute reading by Lúcia Ribeiro, the revision of Chapo's share from 70.67 to 65.17 per cent; and "Mozambique Elections: Frelimo retains parliamentary majority", 23 December 2024 — Frelimo 171 seats of 250, Podemos 43, Renamo 28, MDM 8. Euronews (AP), "Violence after election court ruling claims 21 lives in Mozambique", 25 December 2024. - GIS Reports, "Political crisis in Mozambique rages on" — Plataforma Decide's mid-January 2025 ledger: about 314 killed by firearms, about 633 injured, more than 4,236 arrested — gisreportsonline.com/r/mozambique-election-crisis/. Amnesty International, "Mozambique: Authorities must investigate reports of more than 300 unlawful killings during post-election protest crackdown", February 2025; protests called by Mondlane broke out on 21 October 2024.
- Not held by this desk, reported as gaps: the Government's defence at fls. 49–101; any INCM action
after 29 July; any scheduled replacement legislation; and the report that the Government said it respects the ruling on 3 August, which rests on wire copy rather than a document.