21–25 oct 2026
99 h 44 min
A provider-quality filter switched itself on at its default date and emptied two selection pools, and our hosted proxy service began churning through short-lived connections faster than the database could serve them. For two days connections failed or stalled for many people while database storage grew with the churn, until on Oct 23 a logging fault filled the disk and the platform was down for 16 hours, then 6 more for the storage expansion. That evening the same churn jammed payment reservations, and for about five hours apps could find providers but not send traffic.
Empezó 21 oct, 00:00 UTCTerminó 25 oct, 03:44 UTC
- Interrupción total23 h 32 min
- Interrupción grave14 h 04 min
- Interrupción parcial43 h 27 min
- Degradado17 h 38 min
Leer el postmortem →The pools that connect our servers to the database stalled and could not refill. A cleanup job then mistook the stalled servers for dead ones and removed them, and 97% of providers dropped off the network for almost three hours.
Empezó 19 oct, 09:56 UTCTerminó 19 oct, 19:12 UTC
- Interrupción total2 h 47 min
- Interrupción grave16 min
- Interrupción parcial26 min
- Degradado4 h 05 min
Leer el postmortem →10–13 oct 2026
80 h 19 min
Our main database ran at its limit for three days, and every timeout added retries and more load. While it was overloaded, four separate failures hit users: a new connection check that disconnected healthy providers, a load-balancer collapse, a key rotation that broke new sign-ins, and a stalled connection pooler.
Empezó 10 oct, 00:22 UTCTerminó 13 oct, 08:41 UTC
- Interrupción total2 h 10 min
- Interrupción grave35 h 35 min
- Interrupción parcial19 h 34 min
- Degradado23 h
Leer el postmortem →